A Trilateral Security Idea Emerges
Turkey and Pakistan, two major military actors spanning West Asia and South Asia, have revealed plans to establish a three-way defense partnership with Saudi Arabia. The announcement came as tensions between the United States and Iran threaten once again to destabilize the Middle East. Pakistani Defence Production Minister Raza Hayat Harraj told Reuters on January 15 that such an agreement had long been part of the roadmap, signaling continuity rather than a sudden policy shift.
The timing, however, is closely associated with mounting regional anxiety over Washington’s signals. U.S. President Donald Trump has warned of potential 25% tariffs on Iran’s trading partners, a move that could disrupt supply chains across energy, petrochemicals, and food markets in the region. While the proposed trilateral framework is described as separate from Pakistan’s bilateral defense pact with Saudi Arabia, its emergence highlights a shared desire to build additional layers of strategic coordination.
Not A Collective Defense Pact
Pakistani officials have emphasized that the prospective arrangement would not mirror NATO-style collective defense guarantees. This distinction suggests a cooperative framework focused on coordination, capacity building, and strategic dialogue rather than automatic mutual defense obligations. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed in Ankara that discussions with two regional partners had been underway since last year, although he stopped short of naming them directly.
Fidan described the envisioned mechanism as a common security platform that could eventually serve broader regional interests, provided participating states are able to develop trust. This framing positions the initiative less as a hard military bloc and more as an institutional response to shared uncertainty.
Strategic Motivation And Regional Signaling
Analysts view the initiative as a response to concerns that Washington’s increasingly difficult-to-predict behavior could upset the region’s fragile balance of power and trade flows. Andreas Krieg, associate professor of defense studies at King’s College London, argued that such a pact would signal a more autonomous regional security architecture linking the Gulf, West Asia, and South Asia.
Krieg also suggested the arrangement could reinforce deterrence messaging toward Iran while allowing Riyadh to diversify strategic partnerships beyond traditional Western allies. At the same time, he noted that the framework is more likely to resemble a cooperation and capacity-building package rather than a formal collective defense agreement, partly because binding commitments would face legal hurdles and external pressure from the United States and Israel.
Diverging Priorities, Shared Concerns
Turning political intent into an operational framework will not be straightforward. Saudi Arabia’s priorities center on missile and air defense, maritime security, and perceived threats from Iran. Turkey’s strategic focus remains tied to Syria, the eastern Mediterranean, and its complex relationship with NATO. Pakistan’s security calculations revolve around India, Iran, and domestic counterterrorism needs.
Despite these differences, the three countries share concern over potential economic fallout from U.S. trade measures. At a conference in Abu Dhabi on January 13, UAE Foreign Trade Minister Thani al-Zeyoudi warned that higher U.S. tariffs could affect agricultural and other imports from Iran. Iran is the UAE’s second-largest trading partner, supplying large volumes of agricultural products that feed into the emirate’s food processing industry.
Trade Interdependence With Iran
Economic linkages with Iran amplify regional sensitivity to U.S. policy shifts. Abu Dhabi is assessing how potential tariffs might influence consumer prices and the cost of alternative supply sources. In Pakistan, imports of essential goods such as tomatoes from Iran help ease seasonal supply shortages and inflation pressures. Pakistan, alongside India, is also a major producer of basmati rice, widely consumed in Iran.
Collectively, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia function as critical import channels for Iran’s sanctioned economy and its roughly 90 million consumers. According to Farzan Sabet of the Geneva-based Global Governance Centre, a significant hit to Iran’s trade capacity could push the rial into a deeper collapse than previous record lows, intensifying domestic unrest. This analysis highlights a close association between regional trade stability and Iran’s internal economic conditions.
Resistance To Further Trade Disruption
Given these interdependencies, analysts expect Iran’s major trading partners to oppose new U.S. tariffs, motivated both by economic self-interest and concerns over regional instability. Turkish policy expert Bill Park expressed skepticism that Washington would ultimately impose the proposed measures. He pointed out that Turkey and Iran have recently sought to expand bilateral trade, revive a 2015 preferential trade agreement, and extend a long-term deal for Iranian gas exports to Turkey.
Park argued that Turkey and Iran, alongside other neighbors, would likely seek alternative mechanisms to bypass or soften the impact of any new restrictions. This expectation underscores a broader regional trend toward hedging against U.S. policy uncertainty rather than relying solely on existing security and trade frameworks.
Taken together, the emerging trilateral initiative and parallel trade adjustments illustrate how Middle Eastern and South Asian powers are recalibrating strategies in response to shifting U.S. signals, with security cooperation and economic resilience increasingly intertwined.